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International Trade Agreements and Domestic
Environmental Policy: The NAFTA Example
I. Introduction
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), implemented
for the express purpose of encouraging harmony between man and his
environment, reflects the spirit of activism typifying the late 1960s.
The activist spirit of that period arguably has diminished over the
years, and many policy makers may question the effectiveness of NEPA
after the recent D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Public Citizen
v. United States Trade Representative.2 The Public Citizen court limits the
international impact of NEPA by refusing to apply its requirement of
an environmental impact statement (EIS) to the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA).3 This refusal represents a defeat for envi-
ronmentalists, as Public Citizen demonstrates how NEPA completely
failed to provide the courts with any vehicle to impose NEPA mandates
on international trade agreements submitted to the President. 4
Although environmental issues raised in the negotiations of interna-
tional trade agreements such as NAFrA continue to be scrutinized, 5
Public Citizen unveiled an obvious weakness in federal legislation con-
cerning the environment-leaving the question of NEPA's effective-
1 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
2 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Public Citizen IV].
3 Judge Richey of the district court noted that most government agencies, such as the
State Department, adhered to NEPA requirements when preparing international treaties.
Public Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21, 30
(D.D.C. 1993), rev'd, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Public Citizen III] (citing 22
C.F.R. §§ 161.5(d), 161.7(d)(2) (1992)). In contrast to other government agencies, however,
the Office of the United States Trade Representative (OTR) .did not apply NEPA require-
ments to international trade agreements, so the judicial limitations placed on NEPA merely
reflect the practices of the OTR. See Public Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade
Representative, 782 F. Supp. 139, 140 (D.D.C. 1992), af'd, 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
[hereinafter Public Citizen I and II, respectively].
4 The environmental organizations involved in Public Citizen are planning to appeal to
the United States Supreme Court, however, so the judiciary may not yet be removed from the
controversy surrounding NEPA's application to NAFTA, notwithstanding its adoption. See
International Affairs: Environmental Impact Statement Not Required On Trade Agreement, Federal Ap-
peals Court Says, E.vnL. REP. (BNA) No. 24, at 998 (Oct. 1, 1993). But see Public Citizen IV, 5
F.3d at 550, in which the majority stated, "NAFTA's fate now rests in the hands of the political
branches. The judiciary has no role to play."
5 For example, President Clinton expressly conditioned NAFTA's submission to Con-
gress upon collateral environmental agreements. Public Citizen IV, 5 F.3d 550.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
ness to legislative remedy. 6 This Note begins by examining the
environmentalists' various attacks on NAFTA, including the most re-
cent dispute raised in Public Citizen, in Part II. A survey of relevant
background law is provided in Part III, followed by an analysis of the
Public Citizen opinion in Part IV. Finally, in Part V, this Note concludes
that the court's holding in Public Citizen will not significantly cripple
NEPA's long-term impact on international trade agreements.
II. Statement of the Case
A. Origins of the Dispute
The adversaries in Public Citizen initially clashed during the negoti-
ation process of NAFTA.7 The plaintiffs were several organizations in-
terested in the environment,8 who maintained that NEPA required the
Office of the United States Trade Representative (OTR)9 to prepare
an EIS during its negotiation of NAFTA.10 The district court dismissed
the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, ruling that the envi-
ronmentalists failed to establish standing because the process of nego-
tiating NAFTA was not a particular agency action that injured the
plaintiffs. 1
The plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal only to see
their claim rejected. 12 The appellate court did not address the issue of
the plaintiffs' standing, but based its decision on the failure of the
plaintiffs to identify a "final agency action" that would subject the OTR
to judicial review.13 The court declared that the OTR's refusal to pro-
vide an EIS did not itself constitute final agency action.14 Insisting that
the NAFTA negotiations must result in an actual agreement before be-
ing considered final agency action, the appellate court affirmed the
district court's dismissal.1 5
B. Round One-District Court
The ongoing battle between the environmental organizations and
the OTR culminated in a 1993 courtroom clash when the district court
6 This assertion reflects the majority's statement in Public Citizen IV as quoted supra
note 4.
7 See Public Citizen L 782 F. Supp. at 141.
8 The environmental organizations allied as plaintiffs were Public Citizen, the Sierra
Club, and Friends of the Earth, Inc.
9 The Office of the United States Trade Representative serves as the President's chief
negotiator in trade agreements. 19 U.S.C. § 2171(c)(1)(C) (1988). See also infra note 17.
10 Public Citizen I, 782 F. Supp. at 140.
11 Id. at 143. For further discussion of standing see infra note 92.
12 See Public Citizen II, 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
13 Id. at 917 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988)). For discussion of the finality issue, see infra
notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
14 Id. at 918 (citing Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 85 (D.C. Cir.
1991)).
15 Id. at 920.
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received the opportunity to re-examine the dispute in light of the com-
pleted NAFTA.16 The negotiations with Canada and Mexico had been
settled, and the trade representatives had signed the resulting agree-
ment.' 7 The President was expected to submit NAFTA to Congress
later in the year,' 8 although he was under no obligation to do so. 19
The plaintiffs, still concerned about NAFTA's environmental effects,
filed suit against the OTR, again based upon the failure of the OTR to
include an EIS in the completed NAFTA.20 The OTR countered plain-
tiffs in a four-pronged attack, asserting that (1) the district court did
not have jurisdiction over the dispute; (2) exercising jurisdiction
would be a violation of the constitutional separation of powers; (3) the
plaintiffs had no standing in the action; and (4) NEPA's EIS require-
ment did not pertain to NAFTA.21 The third courtroom battle pro-
vided a brief victory for the environmentalists, however, as the district
court resoundingly rejected the OTR's arguments and held that an EIS
must be prepared regarding the completed NAFTA. 22
1. The APA Jurisdictional Challenge
The district court systematically expounded upon its rejection of
each of the OTR's four contentions, considering the APAjurisdictional
question first.23 The court noted, after an initial examination of
NEPA, that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) grants federal
courts judicial review of final agency actions. 24 The OTR claimed that
the APA did not apply to .NAFTA, however, for several reasons. 25 First,
the OTR declared that the President was ultimately responsible for
NAFTA, and the APA granted no jurisdiction over the President.26 In
response to the OTR's contention, the district court attributed the
bulk of NAFTA's drafting and negotiation to the OTR, a fact conceded
by the defendant.27 The district court concluded that due to the
16 See Public Citizen III, 822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1993).
17 Id. at 22. The United States Trade Representative is appointed by the President and
acts as the representative of the United States when negotiating international trade agree-
ments. 19 U.S.C. § 2171(b), (c)(1)(C) (1988).
18 In fact, the President submitted NAFTA to Congress in November 1993. The House
of Representatives passed the agreement on November 17, and the Senate passed NAFTA on
November 20.
19 Once submitted to Congress, NAFTA would be subject to the legislative "fast track"
procedure. See infra text accompanying notes 126-30 (discussing the fast track procedure
generally).
20 See Public Citizen IlL 822 F. Supp. at 22.
21 Id. at 23.
22 Id. at 30.
23 See id. at 24.
24 See id. (referring to 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988)). See also infra note 91 and accompanying
text.
25 Public Citizen III, 822 F. Supp. at 24.
26 Id. Courts are in agreement that the President is not an agency governed by the APA.
See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
27 Public Citizen I1, 822 F. Supp. at 25.
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OTR's substantial contribution to the drafting of NAFTA, the APA au-
thorization of judicial review of agency actions applied.28 The OTR's
second jurisdictional challenge involved the determination of whether
the completed negotiations of NAFTA constituted final agency action
reviewable under the APA.29 The OTR contended that completed ne-
gotiations of NAFTA did not constitute finality; instead, the final ac-
tion was the submission of NAFTA by the President to Congress for
ratification. 30
The district court looked to NEPA when analyzing the finality
question. 3' Citing several cases which addressed NEPA, the court held
that "a federal agency is still required to prepare an EIS even if a pro-
ject or proposal is not exclusively a federal agency endeavor."3 2 Judge
Richey also gave substantial deference to the regulation promulgated
by the Council for Environmental Quality (CEQ), an entity established
by NEPA. 33 A strong body of case law supports the idea that courts
must give substantial deference to the CEQ regulations' interpretation
of NEPA.3 4 The regulation examined by the district court stated that
NEPA's EIS requirement applied to requests for ratification of treaties
predominantly developed by a federal agency.35 The district court
provided examples of legislative, judicial, and administrative authority
classifying the OTR's status as a federal agency subject to CEQ regula-
tions. 36 In support of its argument that there was no final agency ac-
tion, the OTR cited Franklin v. Massachusetts,37 a Supreme Court
decision holding that the submission of census information to the
President by the Secretary of Commerce did not constitute final
agency action subject to the APA.38 The district court distinguished
the Franklin census from NAFTA by classifying the census as a "tenta-
tive recommendation" that did not bind the President to the results. 39
In contrast, the President could not change the NAFTA signed by Mex-
28 Id.
29 Id. at 23, 24. There must be a final agency action, as opposed to an intermediate
action, to be reviewable by the court. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988).
30 Public Citizen I1, 822 F. Supp. at 24. The court of appeals agreed with the OTR's
contention. See infta text accompanying note 80.
31 Public Citizen III, 822 F. Supp. at 25.
32 Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868 (1st Cir. 1985); Colorado River Indiain
Tribes v. Marsh, 605 F. Supp. 1425 (C.D. Cal. 1985)).
33 Public Citizen 11, 822 F. Supp. at 25.
34 See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 355 (1989); An-
drus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979).
35 Public Citizen III, 822 F. Supp. at 25 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.17 (1992)).
36 Id. at 25 n.4. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 2171 (1988); 15 C.F.R. §§ 2004-2005 (1993); Soucie
v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
37 112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992). See infra notes 110-21 and accompanying text for discussion
of Franklin. The court of appeals found Franklin to be controlling law in overturning the
district court decision.
38 Public Citizen III, 822 F. Supp. at 25. But see discussion of concurring judgment infra
note 121.
39 Public Citizen II, 822 F. Supp. at 26.
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ico and Canada, and Congress was required to approve it or reject it
without amendment.40
The last prong of the OTR's attack on jurisdiction was based on
the argument that the President had no obligation to submit NAFTA
to Congress.41 The district court quickly disposed of this point by de-
claring that once Congress rejected or adopted a submitted proposal,
the right forjudicial review of the procedure introducing the proposal
could be lost permanently.42 The court also declared that NEPA
clearly mandated preparation of an EIS on legislative proposals regard-
less of the President's role in the submission process. 43
2. Separation of Powers
The OTR made a further argument that the application of APA
rules would infringe upon the President's power to "conduct foreign
policy" and therefore violate the separation of powers doctrine.44 The
district court quickly rejected the OTR's contention by reminding the
OTR that Congress had the power to regulate commerce.45 According
to the court, the actual conduct of foreign policy was completed with
the signatures of the United States, Canada, and Mexico, and the EIS
requirement was a domestic issue that did not significantly affect the
President's power to such an extent that it violated the separation of
powers doctrine. 46
3. The Plaintiffs' Standing
After the district court rejected the OTR's first two jurisdictional
challenges, it addressed the OTR's next major argument that plaintiffs
had no standing in this action. 47 The environmentalists argued that
NAFTA would bind federal and state agencies and preempt state laws
protecting the environment, causing injury to members of the plaintiff
organizations. 48 The district court agreed-NAFTA's preemption of
state environmental laws -such as those in Wisconsin and California
would affect individual members of the environmental organizations. 49
Judge Richey also noted that the plaintiffs provided sufficient evidence
of a negative impact on the environment in the United States-Mexico
40 Id. See also 19 U.S.C. § 2191 (d) (1988) (prohibiting amendment to trade agreements
submitted under the fast track procedure).
41 Public Citizen IIl, 822 F. Supp. at 24.
42 Id. at 26 (citing Trustees for Alaska v. Hodel, 806 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1986)).
43 Id.
44 Id. The court of appeals did not address the separation of powers issue. See infra
note 80.
45 Public Citizen III, 822 F. Supp. at 26 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 3).
46 Id. at 27.
47 Id. For further discussion of standing see infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
48 Public Citizen IN, 822 F. Supp. at 27-28.
49 Id.
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border region where members of plaintiff organizations lived.50 This
evidence, the court concluded, was substantial enough to establish
plaintiffs' standing because the "allegation of environmental harms to
particular members of the Plaintiff organizations are sufficiently
concrete."
5 1
The court also briefly referred to other standing issues. 52 Accord-
ing to the plaintiffs, standing was established on the basis of injury to
organizational interests, because without an EIS the plaintiffs could
not adequately inform their members of NAFTA's environmental ef-
fects. 53 The court found it unnecessary to make a holding on this issue
because the environmental organizations established standing through
the interests of their individual members. 54
4. Applying NEPA to NAFTA
The final major argument offered by the OTR involved the appli-
cability of the NEPA EIS requirement to NAFTA.5 5 The court held
that NEPA clearly required the preparation of an EIS on legislative
proposalsP 6 The court, quoting a Ninth Circuit case, argued that
when interpreting "the policies, regulations and public laws of the
United States" courts should adhere to NEPA to the fullest extent pos-
sible. 57 The court then held that the CEQ regulations mandated an
EIS when "federal actions 'establish a precedent for future actions with
significant effects or represent a decision in principle about a future
consideration,' or 'threaten a violation of Federal, State, or local law or
requirements imposed for the protection of the environment."' 5  The
court also noted that even though the fast track rules59 were applicable
to NAFTA, legislative relief by way of an extension could provide the
OTR with ample time to prepare an EIS; therefore, imposing the re-
quirement of an EIS on the OTR was not unduly burdensome or in-
consistent with procedural requirements. 60  The court entered
summary judgment for plaintiff and ordered the OTR to prepare an
EIS on NAFTA, as it was essential for Congress to consider NAFTA's
environmental effects. 6 1
50 Id. at 29.
51 Id.
52 See id. at 27.
53 Id. at 29 n.12. For further discussion of this informational injury, see infra text ac-
companying note 92.
54 See Public Citizen III, 822 F. Supp. at 29. The circuit court did not address this issue.
55 Id. at 23.
56 Id. at 29.
57 Id. (quoting Trustees for Alaska v. Hodel, 806 F.2d 1378, 1382 (9th Cir. 1986)).
58 Id. at 29 n.14 (quoting 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.27(b) (6), (b)(10)).
59 For further discussion of the fast track rules see infra notes 126-30 and accompanying
text.
60 Public Citizen III, 822 F. Supp. at 30 n.15.
61 Id. at 30.
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C. Round Two-On Appeal
1. Issue and Holding
The success of the environmentalists in the district court was a
short-lived one, as the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed
the district court's decision in September 1993.62 Based on the same
facts as those recounted in the district court case, the court of appeals
held that submission of the proposed trade agreement to the President
did not constitute final agency action conferring jurisdiction on the
court, and therefore the court could not enforce the NEPA require-
ments. 63 The court began its analysis by examining NEPA's require-
ment that an EIS must be included "in every recommendation or
report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions sig-
nificantly affecting the quality of the human environment .... "64 The
court noted that NEPA created no private right of action, leaving the
APA as the primary means by which parties might seek to enforce
NEPA. 65 Because "final" agency action was necessary before the APA
could be invoked, the court reasoned that the crux of the dispute fo-
cused on whether the environmentalists could identify a final agency
action. 66
2. Majority Reasoning
The court of appeals held that an earlier decision, Franklin v. Mas-
sachusetts,67 was controlling. The court cited the test used in Franklin to
determine whether an agency action is final: "[T]he core question is
whether the agency has completed its decision-making process, and
whether the result of that process is one that will directly affect the
parties."68 The court, applying the Franklin test, stated that the actions
of the President (submitting NAFTA to Congress), not the actions of
agency, would directly affect the parties.6 9 The President's submission
of the agreement to Congress was final, according to the court, and the
President was not subject to the regulations of the APA. 70
The court of appeals rejected the distinction made by the district
court between Franklin and the present case.71 According to the dis-
trict court, the proposal in Franklin could be altered while in the hands
62 Public Citizen IV, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
63 Id. at 550.
64 Id. at 551 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988)).
65 Id. For a discussion of how the APA works in relation to the NEPA, see infra note 91
and accompanying text.
66 Public Citizen I1, at 551.
67 112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992). For a full discussion of this case, see infra notes 110-21 and
accompanying text.
68 Public Citizen IV, 5 F.3d at 551 (quoting Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 2773).
69 Id. at 551-52.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 552. For discussion of the district court's distinction, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 37-40.
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of the President, but under the procedure governing the submission of
NAFTA, the President could not amend international trade agree-
ments.7 2 The court of appeals dismissed this distinction by asserting
that the President had the power to renegotiate or even completely
refuse to submit NAFTA to Congress. 73 The court of appeals also re-
fused to uphold the environmentalists' argument that the failure to
prepare an EIS directly affected their ability to educate members of
Congress about NAFTA's environmental effects. 74 The court's only re-
sponse to this argument merely reasserted that APA review would only
be triggered in the case of identifiable substantive agency action affect-
ing the parties.75 The plaintiffs further challenged the application of
Franklin as effectively emasculating the NEPA requirements due to the
frequency of "intervening steps," such as the submission of NAFTA to
the President, which prevent the actual agency action from being con-
sidered "final."76 The court of appeals noted that the Franklin require-
ments proved to be difficult hurdles, but then stressed the limited
applicability of Franklin.77 According to the Public Citizen court, Frank-
lin applies only to cases where "the President has final constitutional or
statutory responsibility in the final step necessary for the agency action
directly to affect the parties."78 The court implied that this Presiden-
tial responsibility must be essential to the integrity of the process in
order to qualify as the "final" action thereby removing the proposal
from the jurisdiction of the APA. 7 9
The court of appeals treated Franklin as a dispositive case and, in
applying Franklin's analysis to Public Citizen, reasserted that only the act
of the President submitting NAFTA to Congress could affect the par-
ties directly, and because the President does not perform an agency
action, his submission would not be reviewable under the APA.80
72 Public Citizen IV, 5 F.3d at 552.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. (citing Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 85 (D.C. Cir.
1991)).
76 Id.
77 Id, Franklin requires that (1) the agency complete its decision-making process and
(2) the result of this process directly affect the parties. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct.
2767, 2773 (1992). It appears that the Franklin Court's interpretation of "direct effects" really
equates with "immediate effects" as there is no question that the submission of the census to
the President would affect the parties because no action would be taken by the President
without the submission. It is the intervening act of the President, however, that immediately
affects the parties. The Franklin Court did not address the issue as one of contributing causa-
tion, but rather focused on the "intervening step" of submission to the President. This
proves a difficult hurdle to overcome in the case of any agency proposal that must first pass
through the President before adoption.
78 Public Citizen IV 5 F.3d' at 552.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 553. The government offered further reasons to overturn the district court's
decision. Id. at 552. Alternative arguments offered by the government included a constitu-
tional challenge based on the separation of powers; standing; a request for the court to use
equitable discretion granted by § 702 of the APA; and NEPA's inapplicability to trade agree-
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3. Concurrence ofJudge Randolph
Judge Randolph filed a concurring opinion in which he agreed
that the President's submission of NAFTA to Congress constituted the
only identifiable final agency action, and the President was not subject
to the requirements of NEPA in an action instituted under the APA.81
Judge Randolph's primary concern, though, centered on the concilia-
tory limitations the majority appeared to place on the applicability of
Franklin.82 The concurring opinion exposed a supposed logical fallacy
in any relation between the Franklin "direct effects" test and the nature
of a legislative proposal.83 According to Judge Randolph, a mere legis-
lative proposal of any nature could not "directly affect" any party.84
The direct effect could not'occur until the submitted bill passed and
became law.85 Judge Randolph implied that under the direct effects
test of Franklin, judicial review of NEPA violations in regard to legisla-
tive proposals, at least through the vehicle of the APA, is simply an
impossibility. 6 Although raising the issue of notable contradictions in
prior case law regarding the NEPA EIS requirement,8 7 Judge Ran-
dolph ultimately expressed content that the sole issue in Public Citizen,
the identified "final action" of the President's submission of NAFTA to
Congress, was easily resolved as the President was not subject to the
APA. 88
HI. Background Law
Public Citizen began its analysis by examining NEPA, which pro-
vides a logical starting point for any presentation of background law
relevant to Public Citizen's holding.89 The specific provision of NEPA
allegedly violated in the Public Citizen conflict mandates that federal
agencies
include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legisla-
tion and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible
menu. Id. at 552-53. The court expressly refused to address any of these alternative argu-
menu, finding the sole ground for its holding sufficient. Id. at 553; see supra text
accompanying notes 44-46 for discussion of separation of powers; see supra text accompany-
ing notes 47-54 for a discussion of standing.
81 Public Citizen IV 5 F.3d at 553 (Randolph, J., concurring).
82 Id. (Randolph, J., concurring). See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
83 Public Citizen IV, 5 F.3d at 553 (Randolph, J., concurring).
84 Id. (Randolph,J, concurring).
85 Id. at 553-54 (Randolph, J., concurring).
86 Id. at 554 (Randolph, J., concurring).
87 The contradiction stems from the statement that a court may preside over a NEPA
violation "when the report or recommendation'on the proposal is made, and someone pro-
tests either the absence or the adequacy of the final impact statement." Id. at 554 (Randolph,
J., concurring) (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 406 n.15 (1976)). Compare this
statement to Franklin's "direct effects" test, and the contradiction is obvious. Certainly Kleppe
allows a broader jurisdictional base for NEPA violations.
88 Id. (Randolph, J., concurring).
89 See id. at 551.
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official on... the environmental impact of the proposed action .... 90
Judicial review of NEPA violations is not directly authorized by the
statute; however, the general provisions of the APA authorizingjudicial
review may be applied.91 Several requirements are imposed on a party
invoking the APA's general provisions to confer jurisdiction over
NEPA violations.92 Fulfillment of these requirements establishes a
plaintiff's standing.93
The United States Supreme Court faced the issue of judicial re-
view of alleged NEPA violations in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federa-
tion.9 4 The plaintiffs in National Wildlife Federation challenged the land
withdrawal review program administered by the Bureau of Land Man-
agement (BLM) through which some public land would be opened for
private uses, such as mining.95 The plaintiffs contended that the BLM
program violated NEPA's EIS requirement. 96 The National Wildlife Fed-
eration Court asserted that because NEPA's provisions did not directly
provide for judicial review, the general agency review provisions of the
APA must be met.9 7 In order to meet the APA requirements, the Na-
tional Wildlife Federation Court claimed, the person must suffer a legal
wrong or be adversely affected or aggrieved in a manner contemplated
by the statute allegedly violated, and the agency action causing such
injury must be a final agency action. 98
90 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (1988). In addition to an EIS requirement, NEPA also pro-
vides for the formation of the Council on Environmental Quality, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988),
an agency publishing regulations pertaining to NEPA which offer invaluable guidance to
NEPA's language and should be given substantial deference by the court. Public Citizen IN1
822 F. Supp. 21, 25 (D.D.C. 1993) (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490
U.S. 332, 355 (1989); Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979)). For example, one
regulation states, "Proposals for legislation include requests for ratification of treaties. Only
the agency that has primary responsibility for the subject matter involved will prepare a legis-
lative environmental impact statement." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.17 (1992). The CEQ regulations
further categorize such legislative proposals as "major federal action." Id. § 1508.18. The
court of appeals, however, did not address these regulations. See infra notes 135-40 and ac-
companying text.
91 The relevant APA section provides that "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988).
92 Public Citizen I, 782 F. Supp. 139, 141-42 (D.D.C. 1992), affd, 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir.
1992). In order to establish standing, a plaintiff must first fulfill requirements imposed by
Article III of the United States Constitution. The constitutional requirements are that (1) a
plaintiff demonstrate an injury in fact; (2) the injury be traceable fairly to the challenged
action; and (3) the injury be likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. See, e.g., Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 472 (1982). If suit is brought under the APA the plaintiff must meet additional
requirements imposed by section 702: (1) there must be an identifiable agency action, and
(2) the plaintiff must be aggrieved within the meaning of the relevant statute. See infra text
accompanying notes 97-99.
93 See, e.g., Public Citizen I, 782 F. Supp. at 141-42.
94 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
95 Id. at 876.
96 Id. at 879.
97 Id. at 882. See also 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988) (discussed supra note 91).
98 National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. at 882-83.
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According to the National Wildlife Federation Court, an organization
may also sue on its own behalf if its objective is to publish information
and such objective is impeded by a final agency action, creating what is
known as an "informational injury."99 The plaintiffs in National Wildlife
Federation failed, however, to establish the existence of a final agency
action, because the court concluded that the continuous nature of
BLM programs precluded "final action." 100
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit contin-
ued the National Wildlife Federation Court's scrutiny of the APA's appli-
cability to NEPA violations in City of Los Angeles v. National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration.101 The plaintiffs sued because the defend-
ant failed to prepare an EIS when lowering fuel emission require-
ments.102 The National Highway court set forth the constitutional
elements necessary to maintain "standing" in the federal court.10 3 The
Court further noted that the plaintiffs' action under NEPA satisfied
these elements by showing that the defendant's failure to prepare an
EIS caused actual injury to an interest within the zone of interests pro-
tected by NEPA. 10 4 According to the court's analysis, the risk that seri-
ous environmental effects affecting the plaintiffs would be overlooked
without the preparation of an EIS established an injury sufficient for
"standing."105
Another case relevant to Public Citizen is Kleppe v. Sierra Club.10 6
Kleppe, a precursor to National Wildlife Federation, rejected the idea that
the judiciary was empowered by NEPA to require the preparation of an
environmental impact statement before an agency's formal recommen-
dation or report of a proposal.10 7 In a partial dissent, however, Justice
Marshall voiced his belief that the policy of NEPA requires fair consid-
eration of environmental factors throughout the agency process.' 08
To permit delay of the preparation of an EIS until an actual proposal is
completely drafted, opined Justice Marshall, is to violate NEPA's policy
of early consideration of environmental factors and to encourage a
procedure of preparing a biased EIS that has had no practical effect on
99 Id. at 898-99.
100 Id. at 899. The National Wildlife Federation Court's rationale here was that an ongoing
program, due to its continuous nature, could not be attacked as a "final" agency action. This
implies that a party potentially affected by an agency program would not have standing under
NEPA once the program was implemented.
101 912 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
102 Id. at 483.
103 Id. For a listing of the requirements, see supra note 92.
104 National Highway, 912 F.2d at 483 (quoting Committee for Auto Responsibility v. Sol-
omon, 603 F.2d 992, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
105 Id. The plaintiff satisfied the constitutional standing requirements as well as the addi-
tional APA standing requirements. See supra note 92 for a discussion of standing
requirements.
106 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
107 d. at 405-06.
108 Id. at 415 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the previously drafted proposal. 10 9 Public Citizen, however, focused on
another Supreme Court decision that further illuminated" 0 the issue
of the APA's applicability to submissions of legislative proposals to the
President. In Franklin v. Massachusetts,11 1 the Secretary of Commerce
submitted a census report to the President, and Massachusetts chal-
lenged the results. 112 The Franklin majority held that Massachusetts'
claim could not be subject to judicial review under the APA because
the Secretary's submission did not constitute a final agency action.11 3
According to the Franklin Court, the role of the APA was to set
"forth the procedures by which federal agencies are accountable to the
public and their actions subject to review by the courts."1 14 The Frank-
lin Court further stipulated that the President was not an agency within
the meaning of the APA. 115 Although the President was not expressly
excluded from the bounds of the APA, he was not expressly included
either, and the Franklin Court invited Congress to subject the President
to the APA by statute. Otherwise, the Court concluded, the President
would continue to be presumed exempt from the mandates of the
APA.1" 6 As the President was not bound by the census information,
the Franklin Court held, his submission of the information to Congress
is what truly constituted the final action, so no "final agency action"
brought the information into the dominion of the APA.11 7
Justice Stevens, concurring in part, and concurring in the judg-
ment, opined that the submission of the census report to the President
did constitute "final agency action" subjecting it to judicial review
under the APA.118 Justice Stevens supported his conclusion by assert-
ing that prior legislation completely excluded the President from the
census report process, and that even after his inclusion, his function
was purely ministerial. 119 Justice Stevens further claimed that the stat-
ute allowing Presidential review of the census report before submission
to Congress did not grant the President authority to modify the census
figures produced by the Secretary of Commerce.' 20 In a final observa-
tion by Justice Stevens, he noted that his "conclusion that the Secre-
tary's action was reviewable makes it unnecessary for me to consider
whether the President is an 'agency' within the meaning of the
109 Id. at 415-17.
110 Some might argue that this case further obscured the issue.
111 112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992).
112 Id. at 2770.
113 Id. at 2773.
114 Id.
115 Id. The conclusion that the President was not subject to the APA had previously been
reached in the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. See Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282
(D.C. Cir. 1991).
116 Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 2775-76.
17 Id. at 2774.
118 Id. at 2779 (Stevens, J., concurring).
119 Id. at 2780-81 (Stevens, J., concurring).
120 Id. at 2782 (StevensJ, concurring).
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Franklin was decided after other jurisdictions had grappled with
similar finality questions relating to NEPA's applicability to various leg-
islative proposals and the policy considerations behind NEPA's EIS re-
quirement.122 In Trustees for Alaska v. HodeI the Ninth Circuit held
that failure to allow public comment on an EIS before submission to
Congress was a violation of NEPA.123 The defendant in Trustees for
Alaska contended that no proposal had been submitted to Congress;
therefore, no final action had been taken.1 2 4 The Ninth Circuit dis-
agreed, claiming that the failure to allow public comment on the EIS
constituted a final agency action, and once the proposal did pass to
Congress, the public would lose its fight to comment on the proposal
at an administrative level.1 25
A final bit of background law worthy of exploration is the proce-
dure for ratification of an international trade agreement known as the
"fast track" process. 126 According to provisions governing the fast
track procedure, after completion of negotiations by the OTR, the
President submits the trade agreement, along with accompanying legis-
lation to implement the agreement, to Congress. 127 Congress must
vote on whether to implement the agreement within sixty legislative
days after submission. by the President.1 28 The fast track procedure
denies Congress any power to amend the agreement.1 29 Trade agree-
ments submitted through the fast track procedure will only be effective
upon adoption of implementing legislation by both Houses of
Congress. 130
IV. Significance of the Case
The district court and the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
began their respective analyses of Public Citizen in a similar manner.1 3 '
Each court examined the provisions of NEPA and found that the APA
supplied the only vehicle for jurisdiction since NEPA itself provided no
121 Id. at 2783 n.15. Justice Stevens claimed that although the census report prepared by
the Secretary of Commerce did constitute final agency action subject to judicial review under
the APA, deference must be given to overriding constitutional and Census Act considerations
(these overriding considerations are not relevant to Public Citizen), which explains his final
concurrence in the judgment. Id. at 2778.
122 See, e.g., Trustees for Alaska v. Hodel, 806 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1986). Actual prepara-
tion of the EIS was not at issue in this case.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 1381.
125 Id.
126 See 19 U.S.C. § 2903(b) (1988).
127 See 19 U.S.C. § 2903(a) (1) (B) (1988).
128 Id. § 2191(e).
129 Id. § 2191(d).
130 Id. § 2903(a)(1).
131 See supra text accompanying notes 24, 62-63.
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private cause of action. 32 It was after this initial reference to NEPA
that the courts diverged dramatically. The district court, though stat-
ing that its jurisdiction was based on the APA, gave substantial defer-
ence to NEPA regulations.13 3 These regulations clearly presented
the idea that NEPA should be applied to international trade
agreements.134
In contrast, once the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
asserted that the APA was its basis forjurisdiction, it cast aside all of the
NEPA provisions as well as the CEQ regulations accompanying
NEPA. 135 The CEQ regulations attempted to define the APA's role
regarding treaty proposals,' 3 6 and the court's decision to ignore the
regulations demonstrated that any attempts to apply NEPA to interna-
tional trade proposals would be futile, 137 regardless of the agency's in-
terpretation of NEPA's applicability. The court's decision effectively
overrode the Supreme Court's substantial deference standard 138 by im-
plying that if NEPA provides no jurisdiction, its regulations are com-
pletely irrelevant. This implication of "cutting things off at the pass"
allowed the court to avoid major issues debated in preceding cases, 139
and presented inconsistencies between Public Citizen and precedent.1 40
132 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
133 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. In the actual determination of whether the
APA applied to the OTR's submission of NAFTA to the President, the district court drew
upon language and case law under NEPA. Public Citizen III, 822 F. Supp. 21, 24 (D.D.C.
1993).
134 See supra notes 89-90.
135 The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit drew its analysis from the Franklin case,
with no reference to the CEQ regulations.
136 See supra notes 89-90.
137 The foundation of Public Citizen's holding, the Franklin "direct effects" test, effectively
eliminates any imposition of NEPA requirements on legislative proposals such as interna-
tional trade agreements. Public Citizen IV, 5 F.3d 549, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Randolph,J,
concurring).
138 The Supreme Court held that the CEQ's regulations interpreting NEPA should be
given substantial deference by the courts. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490
U.S. 332, 355 (1989); Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979).
139 Because the court treated Franklin as dispositive, it specifically chose not to address
other arguments offered by the OTR and discussed by the district court, such as the separa-
tion of powers and standing issues. See supra note 80. Although the district court's own
address of the separation of powers issue was brief, see supra text accompanying notes 44-46,
and unnecessary to the decision in Public Citizen IV, see supra note 80, the issue of standing was
arguably relevant to the Franklin direct effects test. See Public Citizen IV, 5 F.3d at 551-52. The
majority in Public Citizen stated, "To determine whether an agency action is final, 'the core
question is whether the agency has completed its decisionmaking process, and whether the
result of that process is one that will directly affect the parties.'" Id. at 551 (quoting Franklin
v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct. 2767, 2773 (1992)). The plaintiffs claimed that the OTR had
completed its decisionmaking process, and the OTR's exclusion of an EIS directly affected
the plaintiffs as environmental organizations because it deprived them of the ability to lobby
and educate Congress about NAFTA's impact on the environment. Id. at 552. The Public
Citizen court simply responded that the inability of the plaintiffs to inform and lobby Con-
gress due to the absence of an EIS did not "directly affect" the parties since no final agency
action was identified. Id. The circularity of the court's arguments is obvious. See also supra
text accompanying note 99 for discussion of "informational injury."
140 A sigh of relief was echoed in Public Citizen's concurrence, as the majority's treatment
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Though specifically addressing international trade agreements, by
issuing an opinion in disregard of the CEQ regulations, the Public Citi-
zen court renders NEPA impotent in many other international arenas
where it previously had been influential. 14' Other government agen-
cies have adhered to NEPA's EIS requirement in negotiating interna-
tional treaties.1 42  Because the submission of a trade agreement
proposal is not considered final agency action, agencies formerly ad-
hering to NEPA may decide to emulate the court's disregard for the
CEQ regulations when their treaty proposals are to be submitted to the
President.
The environmentalists echoed this concern when they argued that
the frequency of "intervening steps," such as the submission of the
NAFTA proposal to the President, will render NEPA ineffective.1 43 In
a conciliatory tone, the Public Citizen court limited Franklin's applicabil-
ity to cases where the role of the President is essential. 144 In attempt-
ing to place limitations on the application of Franklin, however, the
Public Citizen decision may spawn a great deal of controversy over the
enigmatic standard of whether the President's role is considered essen-
tial. 1 45 The court stressed that the APA may still apply if the Presi-
dent's role in the agency process is nonessential. 146 The ambiguity
and indecisiveness of this statement foreshadows more litigation since
the court provided little criteria for deciding the nature of the Presi-
dent's role as essential.1 47
Additional analysis of the case law decided prior to Public Citizen
reveals attempts to allow a broader time period for judicial review of
agency action in light of the time constraint issue raised in Trustees for
Alaska.148 Public Citizen's presumption at the district court level that
the President is not an agency, which is consistent with Franklin, pro-
vided relief from the fast track time constraints as a practical matter.1 49
of Franklin as a dispositive case saved judicial effort in reconciling inconsistencies arising
from prior case law. For example, see supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
141 See supra note 3.
142 Public Citizen III, 822 F. Supp. 21, 30 (D.D.C. 1993).
143 See Public Citizen IV, 5 F.3d at 552.
144 For discussion of the limited applicability of Franklin, see supra notes 77-79 and ac-
companying text.
145 See Public Citizen IV, 5 F.3d at 552.
146 Id.
147 See id.
148 See, e.g., Trustees of Alaska v. Hodel, 806 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1986). For discussion of
time constraint issue, see supra text accompanying notes 122-25. Although Trustees ofAlaska is
a Ninth Circuit decision, and thus not controlling, it raises valid policy issues and was quoted
by the district court. See Public Citizen III, 822 F. Supp. 21, 27 (D.D.C. 1993).
149 See Public Citizen III, 822 F. Supp. at 26. Because the President is not an agency, his
submission of a trade agreement or other legislative proposal to Congress is not final agency
action; therefore, if there is any final agency action found, it would be the submission of the
proposal to the President. Then, the period of judicial review would be extended through-
out the sojourn of the proposal with the President. If the President himself was found to be
an agency, there would be no time in which a court may review a legislative proposal because
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No statutory language bars the President from being considered as an
agency. Perhaps, then, the courts earlier adopted the position that the
President is not an agency to provide an easy solution for widening the
window of time available for review of legislative proposals.150 A poten-
tial legislative reaction to the court of appeals' decision in Public Citi-
zen, however, would be to accept the judicial invitation issued in
Franklin to expressly codify the President's status as an agency151 and
effectively bar the courts from any review of international treaty pro-
posals under which jurisdiction is conferred through the APA.
The Public Citizen case displayed the palpitating weakness of
NEPA. Without a private cause of action under the NEPA, judicial re-
view of EIS violations will be subject to the APA and its procedural
requirements, limiting NEPA's applicability to international treaties. 152
V. Conclusion
The majority in Public Citizen based its holding on the Franklin
case, possibly to the neglect of other sound interpretations of statutory
and case law employed by the district court. 153 However, the court
betrayed its unease with its holding both in the majority and concur-
ring opinions by acknowledging the sometimes harsh result from ap-
plying Franklin154 and mentioning alternative routes that may be
pursued in order to protect the environment. 155 The unease ex-
pressed by the court, as well as the commitment of the environmental
organizations to seek certiorari, 156 demonstrate that some of the ac-
tivist spirit of the 1960s that gave birth to NEPA has survived into the
the President's submission to the legislature would be a final agency action, transferring the
proposal from judicial to legislative review immediately.
150 Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct. 2767, 2774 (1992). One draws the logic from
Kippe that a specific point in time marks reviewable agency action. If the President were
considered an agency, his submission to Congress might plausibly be considered a final
agency action, and the opportunity for judicial review before legislative implementation
would be severely limited as explained in note 149, supra.
151 Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 2775.
152 Indeed, the Public Citizen court's failure to consider CEQ regulations in light of Frank-
lin's interpretation of the APA demonstrates that NEPA was never consulted as an authority
by the court at all. However, even if the legislature amends NEPA to include a cause of
action, the OTR still has a strong basket of alternative arguments to explore. See supra note
80.
153 See, e.g., supra note 33 and accompanying text.
154 Public Citizen IV, 5 F.3d 549, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
155 The majority seemed almost consoling in its tone when expressing a "fear not-
Franklin does have its limits" rationale. I. The majority further took pains to point out that
the President has made his submission of NAFTA, to Congress expressly contingent on collat-
eral agreements regarding, among other things, environmental laws. Id. at 550. The concur-
ring opinion adopts the same conciliatory style when mentioning that congressional initiative
is one option which may bar legislative proposals'with adverse effects of the environment-
through either hearings on NAFTA's environmental effects or congressional refusal to con-
sider legislative proposals. Id. at 554 (Randolph, J., concurring).
156 See supra note 4.
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1990s as another generation pursues the goal of giving NEPA some
teeth.
If nothing else, the debate over environmental concerns regard-
ing NAFTA and other international trade agreements will continue to
rage. Environmental organizations, realizing that their legislative
weapon is ineffective, will pressure Congress to provide them with am-
munition in the form of an amendment to NEPA.
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